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Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application
of the All-PayAuction
By MICHAEL R. BAYE, DAN KOVENOCK, AND CASPER

Whydo politiciansfrequently"announce"
that they have narroweddown a set of potential recipientsof a "prize" to a slate of
finalists?' In general, does the slate of finalists comprisethe "best" candidates,and
does the best candidate alwayswin?2 This
paper provides answersto these questions.
Our model of the politicalprocess is one of
rent-seeking, which takes the (perhaps
overlyjaded) view that persons with power
award political prizes on the basis of selfinterest.
In a world where a politiciancan explicitly auction off a prize to the high bidder,
the standardauction literaturecan be used
to analyze political behavior. The justice
system,however,precludespoliticiansfrom
explicitly selling the prize to the highest
bidder;thus politicianscannot let it become
public knowledgethat they are in the business of selling politicalfavors.
An interestinginstitutionhas emerged in
political markets to overcome this constraint: lobbying. Lobbyists make implicit
payments to the politician, through campaign contributionsor "wining-and-dining."
If these up-frontpaymentswere rebated to
those failing to receive the prize, it would
be clear that the politician was selling fa-

* Baye: Department of Economics, Pennsylvania
State University, University Park, PA 16802; Kovenock:
Department of Economics, Purdue University, West
Lafayette, IN 47907; de Vries: Department of Economics, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, P.O. Box
1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands. We are
grateful to Donald Deere, Tom Gresik, Tim Gronberg,
Bill Nielson, Guoqiang Tian, Steve Wiggins, and three
anonymous referees for suggestions that led to improved content and exposition.
'The International Olympic Committee, for instance, selected six cities as "finalists" for the 1996
Summer Olympics: Belgrade, Manchester, Toronto,
Melbourne, Athens, and Atlanta.
2Atlanta won the bid for the 1996 Olympics.
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vors. It is natural, therefore, for a political
institution to arise such that lobbyists "ante
up" before the prize is awarded, and these
up-front payments are not refunded to those
failing to win the prize. This view of lobbying has a structure isomorphic to the all-pay
auction, which differs from standard auctions in one principal respect: all bids are
forfeited by the bidders.
Before we describe our model of the lobbying process, it is useful to provide an
overview of the existing literature and to
contrast it with the present analysis. The
case in which more than two lobbyists value
the prize identically was first analyzed by
Herve Moulin (1986), who characterizes the
symmetric equilibrium to the all-pay auction. Similar analysis is provided by Arye
Hillman (1988), who argues that the equilibrium is unique. It turns out, however, that
the symmetric equilibrium is not unique; in
fact there is a continuum of equilibria (in
Baye et al. [1990], we provide a full characterization of the equilibria.)
The case in which some lobbyists value
the prize more than others has been analyzed by, among others, Hillman and John
Riley (1989), who argue that equilibrium
involves only the top two lobbyists. In this
Review, Tore Ellingsen (1991) has considered the interesting case in which one lobbyist values the prize more than n -1 competitors with common valuations (see his
proposition 1), and he demonstrates the existence of n equilibria. Baye et al. (1990)
have shown, however, that there actually
exists a continuum of equilibria in this case.
Moreover, the expected revenue earned by
the politician differs across this continuum
of equilibria; there is not revenue equivalence across the equilibria.
The present analysis provides a simple
closed-form expression for expected revenues that is valid for all equilibria. Our
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techniquedoes not requirean explicitcalculation of the Nash-equilibriummixed strategies. Consequently,our results provide a
frameworkwith which one may reexamine
the implicationsof the equilibriamissed for
previousresults, without explicitlycalculating the (uncountableinfinity)of equilibria.
The objective of the present paper is to
take into accountthe continuumof equilibria and to determine the amount of rents
the politiciancan expect to earn given such
a political institution.To answerthis question, we model the political process as a
two-stagegame of complete information.In
stage 1 the politiciantakes the political institution of lobbyingas given but is free to
constrainthe process by "narrowingdown"
the slate of candidatesto a set of "finalists."
In stage 2, the finalistscompete in an all-pay
auction:the lobbyistgivingthe greatestbribe
wins the prize, while the others receive
nothing for their payments. We solve this
decision problem by backwardsinduction,
solving first for the Nash-equilibriumpayments that accrue to the politician in the
second-stagelobbyinggame given an arbitraryset of lobbyists.We then solve for the
optimalfirst-stagedecision of the politician,
which involves the selection of the set of
"finalists"that maximizesexpected political
rents. We will show that, under plausible
circumstances,the politicianhas a perverse
incentiveto preclude lobbyistsmost valuing
the prize from participatingin the secondstage lobbying game. Intuitively,this precommitmentmay take the form of announcing prior to any lobbyingthat "five states
have been selected as finalistsfor the site of
a new militarybase." We will refer to this
precommitment as the exclusion principle.

The exclusionprinciplehas obviousimplications for efficiency;states derivingthe greatest economic benefit from a militarybase
(and hence having the highest valuation of
the prize)maybe excludeda priorifrom the
announcedset of finalists.
I. The Model
Consider a politician who must determine
which of n > 2 lobbyists will receive a prize.
The value of the prize to lobbyist i is vi > 0,
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where the vi's are common knowledge and
ordered such that v1 ? v2 ?> * ? vn.
The politician does not care which lobbyists wins the prize but does care about how
much money he has available in his campaign chest. Accordingly, he decides to
award the prize to the lobbyist who gives
him the greatest up-front, nonrefundable
implicit bribe. The objective of the politician is to select a set of lobbyists (the set of
finalists) that maximizes his expected rents,
W= En7=lbi, where bi is the bribe paid by
player i.
Given a set of "finalists," lobbying is an
all-pay auction: the payoff to lobbyist i if he
offers a bribe of bi is vi = vi - bi if bi is the
highest of all n bribes. However, if some
other lobbyist offers a higher bribe, lobbyist
i's payoff is 7i = - bi. We assume that when
multiple lobbyists submit the highest bribe,
the prize is awarded to one of them at
random. Thus, the payoff of lobbyist i is
given by
if bi > bj V i

vi -bi
lvi
(1)

ri(b)

bi

j
if i ties M - 1 others
for high bid

{M

l- bi

if bi < bj for some
I * i.

This payoff structure is standard in the lobbying literature (cf. Hillman, 1988). It can
also be viewed as the limiting case of an
alternative payoff structure suggested by
Gordon Tullock (1980) that is also used in
this literature (see Baye et al., 1989). In
Section II we characterize the expected
payments by lobbyists in the second-stage
lobbying game. These results are used in
Section III to determine the politician's
rent-maximizing selection of the set of
"finalists."
II. The LobbyingGame
We first sketch a proof of the nonexistence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
for the all-pay auction. Consider the twoplayer case and suppose (bl, b2) did comprise a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
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(without loss of generality, suppose b1 2 b2).
If b1 < v2, player 2 could deviate to earn a
higher payoff by increasing b2 slightly above
b1 to win the prize. If b1l v2, player 2's
best reply to b1 is zero; but with b2 = 0, it
pays player 1 to deviate from b1 by lowering
the bid to (small) E > 0, contradicting the
hypothesis that b1 2 v2.
It is known, though, that there does exist
an equilibrium in mixed strategies, in which
lobbyists randomize their bribes (cf. Partha
Dasgupta and Eric Maskin, 1986; Moulin,
1986; Hillman and Riley, 1989; Baye et al.,
1990). Moreover, with more than two players, there generally exists a continuum of
possible equilibria (Baye et al., 1990). As
our focus centers around the politician's
rent-maximizing selection of finalists, we
need only characterize the expected total
bribes that accrue in a given Nash equilibrium of the lobbying game. The innovation
is that the techniques employed below do
not rely on the algebraic form of the mixed
strategies used by the lobbyists in equilibrium and, thus, are valid even in the presence of a continuum of Nash equilibrium
mixed strategies.
The following theorem is the key ingredient that enables us to determine the set of
finalists that maximizes the politician's rents.
The novelty of the result is that it is valid
for each equilibrium in the continuum of
possible Nash equilibria and thus can be
used for purposes beyond the present paper. For example, the formula allows one to
strengthen the results of Ellingsen (1991),
which are based on a finite subset of equilibria.
2 vVn deTHEOREM 1: Let vl 2 V2
note the valuations of lobbyists {1,2,...,n} in
the stage-2 lobbying game. Let E1b1 denote
the expected bid of a lobbyist with the highest
valuation. Then in any Nash equilibrium,
(2)

W=-V2
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+ 1-

Elbl <

V2.

PROOF:
Let Fi(bi) denote the cumulative distribution function of lobbyist i in an arbitrary

(mixed-strategy) Nash equilibrium, and let
Si denote the support of the distribution.
Lobbyist i must earn constant (expected)
profits almost everywhere (a.e.) in Si, For
lobbyist 1 this constant must equal v1- v29
and for lobbyists 2,3,...,n, this constant is
zero (see Baye et al., 1990).3 Hence, the
following conditions must hold:
n

(3)

rHF(b)[vj-bj]

w1(b)=

i?l

n
+ [1 -

Fi (bl1) ][bl1]

a.e. on S

=
V1- V2
and
n

(4)

wri(bi)

=

Fj(bi) [vi - bi]
J ?J]

[1

H Fj(bi)
,1

[bi]

= ?

a.e. on Si, i =#1.
Let pi(bi) = H>jniFj(bi) denote the probability that lobbyist i wins the prize, conditional
on his bid and the strategies employed by
the other n -1 lobbyists in a Nash equilibrium.4 Then, since equations (3) and (4)
hold almost everywhere in their respective
supports, taking the expectations of these
equations and manipulating reveals that

(5)

Piv - Elbl = vl-

V2

and
(6)

Pivi-Eibi=0

Vi#1

where E denotes the expectation with respect to lobbyist j's (equilibrium) mixed

3Note that when lobbyist 2's valuation equals that of
lobbyist 1, V1 -2 = 0.
4We can rule out mass points for any agent at a bid
b > 0 (see Baye et al., 1990).
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strategy and Pj Ejpj(bj). Summing over
equations(5) and (6), we then obtain
n

(7)

EJbI

Wj=1

=(P1-1)Vl+

EPivi+v2.

W= (P1-1)v1

+ (2-P1)v2.

Rearranging(5), we find
P

=-

v1 -v2 + Elb1
V1

which, insertedinto (8), yields our results.
ITwo implicationsof Theorem 1 are worth
noting. First, if two or more players most
value the prize at some common level, v,
the expectedrents accruingto the politician
equal v; there is full rent dissipation.Secondly, if v1> v2, then the expected rents
accruing to the politician are strictly less
than v2, since E1b, < v2 in any Nash equilibrium. In other words, regardless of
whetherthere is a unique equilibrium5or a
continuumof equilibria,6in every equilibrium there is underdissipationof rents. In
the followingsection, this resultwill be used
to establish when it pays a politician to
preclude some lobbyistsfrom competingin
the lobbyinggame. First, however,we state
the followinglemma from Hillman and Riley (1989).
LEMMA 1: Suppose that the valuations of
the lobbyists in the stage-2 lobbyinggame are
such that v1 2 V2 > V3 2 V4 * *
Vn. Thenin
the unique Nash equilibrium,Eb1 = V2/2.

5The equilibriumis uniquewhen V2 > V3.
6There is a continuum of equilibria when

Theorem 1 and Lemma 1 together imply
that, when two players value the prize
strictlymore than all other players,the expected rents accruingto the politicianin the
stage-2 lobbyinggame are

(9)

Applyingthe fundamentaltheorem of integral calculus to E>1 Pj, it follows that
EY=jPi = 1. Furthermore,if v2 > vi, i > 2,
then Pi = 0 (see Baye et al., 1989, 1990).
Hence,
(8)

MARCH 1993

THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW

292

1

W(Vl,V2)

V2

]2

Note that,when v1 > V2 > V3, expectedrents
are increasingin v2 but decreasing in v1.
Intuitively,as player l's valuationincreases,
the playing field becomes more unequal.
Hence, player 2 reduces his expected payment to the politician, and total expected
rents decline.
It is importantto note that the formulain
equation (9) is based on specific configurations of valuations and does not hold in
general(it does not hold when v1 > v2 = V3).
The reason is that, when v1 > V2 = V3, Eb1
in equation(2) variesdependingupon which
of the continuum of equilibria is played,
and thus, the politician'sexpected rents depend upon which equilibriumthe lobbyists
play. This point has not been addressedin
the existingliterature,and it plays a crucial
role in our analysis.
III. Selectingthe Finalists

Since there exists a continuum of expected political rents for some configurations of valuations, our next task is to
characterizepropertiesof the maximumexpected political rents that can be extracted
from the lobbyists.
is a rentPROPOSITION 1: If ...,m}
maximizing set of finalists (with valuations
v ), then expected rents are
vi > ...*

(10)

(

(

V
A

PROOF:
We must show that if {i,..., mA}
is a set of
finaliststhat maximizesexpected rents (and
V2=

V3.

the corresponding valuations are v 12
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...

>

vm), then expected rents are W(v1,v2). This
is clearly true if m = 2; hence, suppose m >
- v, equation (2) reveals that
2. If v? =
W= v = W(1v1,132).If V
V2> V3, equation
(9) shows again that W = W(v?, v2). Finally,
if Vi > V2 = V3 - VIexpected rents increase
by excluding player 1, since by Theorem 1
W(v1, V2) < V2 = W(V2 N3). However, this
contradicts the hypothesis that the set
{1,.. , m) maximizes expected rents. Hence,
we conclude that any rent-maximizing set of
finalists generates expected rents of
W(A1,

V2)A

Thus, while equation (9) does not hold
for all possible configurations of values, it
does hold when the set of finalists is selected so as to maximize expected rents
[equation (10)]. This result allows us to determine the set of finalists that maximizes
the politician's expected rents. Specifically,
since equation (10) is decreasing in the
highest valuation and increasing in the
second-highest valuation, it never pays to
exclude a player with a valuation that lies
between the valuations of any two lobbyists
who are in the set of finalists. Thus, the
expected rent-maximizing set of finalists is
determined by considering all pairwise combinations of adjacent lobbyists until lobbyists k and k + 1 are found such that
W(Vk,Vk+l)

=

max W(vi,vi+1)

To realize these rents, the politician must
exclude players with valuations greater than
vk from the set of finalists. Formally, we
have shown the following:
V
V3 ?
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose v,? V2
Then the politician maximizes ex*. * 2Vn.
pected rents by constructing a set of finalists
that excludes lobbyists with valuations strictly
greater than Vk' where k is such that

(

Vk

)2
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(

v)

2

vi

In order to highlight the implications of
our results, consider the following two
corollaries.

COROLLARY1: Supposev1 =

V2 2 V3

...

Then the politician does not gain by
constructing an agenda that excludes some
lobbyistsfrom the lobbying game.
> vn

COROLLARY 2: Suppose v1 >

V2 = V3

2

Then the politician maximizes ex**
vn.
pected rents by excluding the lobbyist with the
highest valuation from the set of finalists.
It may also be optimal for a politician to
exclude more than one lobbyist from the
stage-2 game. For instance, suppose v1>
Vn,. Then the politician
V2> V3 = V4 2 **
maximizes expected rents by constructing an
agenda that excludes lobbyists 1 and 2 from
the set of finalists whenever
(1+ i2<V3
These results demonstrate the exclusion
principle: a politician may benefit from precluding the lobbyists valuing the prize the
most from participating in the lobbying process.
We conclude with a numerical example
to aid in elucidating our findings. Suppose
v1 = 50, v2 = 40, and v3 = 38. The theorem
and lemma imply that the politician earns
W = 36 if he does not constrain the lobbying
process or limits lobbying to only players 1
and 2. However, if the politician announces
that players 2 and 3 are the finalists, then
the expected payments to the politician are
W(40, 38) = 37.05. Thus it pays the politician
to exclude lobbyist 1, who values most the
prize, from participating in the lobbying
game.
IV. Conclusions
This paper has examined an interesting
principle arising in all-pay auctions: the exclusion principle. This principle states that a
politician wishing to maximize political rents
may find it in his best interest to exclude
certain lobbyists from participating in the
lobbyists
lobbying process-particularly
valuing most the political prize. In addition
to pointing out the exclusion principle, our
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Theorem 1 characterizes expected revenue
for the entire continuum of equilibria that
can arise in n > 2-player all-pay auctions
with arbitraryvaluations of the prize. This is
in contrast to the results of Ellingsen (1991),
Hillman (1988), Hillman and Riley (1989),
and Hillman and Dov Samet (1987), among
others, which are valid only for a subset of
possible equilibria.
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